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The first symposium held on the proposals to include
intellectual property rights within the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations' was published by The Vanderbilt

B.A. Univ. of Chicago 1955; J.D. Yale 1979; Professor of Law,
Vanderbilt University. Copyright J.H. Reichman 1996.
1.
See Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este. Sept. 20, 1986, GATT
Doc. Min. Dec. No. 86-1572; Jane A. Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights,
Investment, and Trade In Services In the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations,
23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987). See also EDWARD S. YAMBRUSIC, TRADE BASED
APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7-24 (1991); SHU ZANG,
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Journal of TransnationalLaw in 1989.2 It seemed only fitting to
return to this same Journal with a retrospective evaluation of the
finished product by members of the American Association of Law
Schools' (AALS) Intellectual Property Section in 1996.3
That
product is Annex IC of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), better known as

the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement or Agreement). 4 This Agreement has
already spawned a voluminous literature, including other
symposiums, 5 which attests to its cardinal importance and to the

DE L'OMPI Au GATT-LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DRoIrs DE LA PROPRilTIA
INTELLECTUELLE 191-353 (1994).

2.
See generally Symposium. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (pt. 1), 689 (pt. II) (1989). The symposium
included articles by Frederick M. Abbott, R. Michael Gadbaw, David Hartridge &
Arvind Subramanian. Robert W. Kastenmeler & David Beier, Hans Peter KunzHallstein, William M. Walker, Carlos A. Primo Braga, and J.H. Reichman, plus
comments by Donald S. Chisum, Paul Goldstein, Robert Hudec, Suman Naresh,
John H. Jackson, Emory Simon, Harvey Schein, Ralph Oman, Michael
Remington, Yoichiro Yamaguchi, I. Fred Koenigsberg, and Alice T. Zalick. These
articles still shed considerable light on the origins and meaning of the TRIPS
Agreement, Infra note 4.
3.
The articles collected here were originally presented to the Annual
Meeting of the Intellectual Property Section, American Association of Law Schools
(AALS), San Antonio, Texas, on January 4, 1996. As outgoing Chair of the
Section, I wish to express the gratitude of all its members to Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss. current Chair. to Jessica Litman, a past Chair, and to Marshal Leaffer,
current Secretary, for their invaluable assistance in planning and organizing this
event. The Section is also indebted to Wendy J. Gordon, current Chair-Elect, for
serving with me as co-moderator of the program.
4.
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter Final Act], reprinted in
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE

LEGAL TEXTS 2-3 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]. reprintedin RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at 6-19, 365-403.
For U.S. congressional approval, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, §§ 101-103, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter URAA] (authorizing the
President to accept the Uruguay Round Agreements and Implement the WTO
Agreement, but denying treaty status and domestic legal effect to the Uruguay
Round Agreements as such, and excluding private actions under those
agreements).
5.
See, e.g., GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989);
Symposium, The Implications of GATT on U.S. Intellectual Property Laws, 22 AIPLA
Q.J. 259-583 (1994); LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTHE
URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT (Giorgio Sacerdoti ed., 1990). See also Symposium,
Uruguay Round-GATT/WTO, 29 INT'L LAW. 335 (1995); Special Issue, Intellectual
Property In EastAsia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1994); COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
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INTRODUCTION

new departure it represents for international intellectual property
relations.
However, no previous symposium has sought to gauge the
responses to these developments of the professors who teach

intellectual property law at U.S. universities.

In

planning this

year's meeting of the AALS Intellectual Property Section,
therefore, the officers felt the time had come to rectify this
imbalance. The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement will set a new
research agenda for the foreseeable future. At the compliance
stage, the opinions of publicists 6 will play a role in interpreting
these provisions and, especially, in applying the WTO Agreement's
new dispute-resolution machinery to actual disputes between
member states. 7 By acquainting legislators, administrators, and
industrialists with the spectrum of scholarly opinion in this
country, we hope to better prepare them for the challenges and
risks of the coming transitional period 8 and the tensions it seems
certain to elicit. 9

ROUND-A RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Jeffrey

J. Schott ed., 1990); Symposium, The Uruguay Round and the Future of World
Trade, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992); GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS].
6.
See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
art. 38(b). 59 Stat. 105, T.S. No. 993; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903 (1987).
7.
See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter Settlement of
Disputes]; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 64, 68 (incorporating by
reference WTO Agreement, supra note 4, Annex IA: Multilateral Agreements on

Trade In Goods-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, arts. XXII and
XXIII, reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 4, at 21-23
[hereinafter GATT 1994]); see also Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the
Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389 (1995);
Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATTWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., forthcoming
1996); Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact
of TRIPS Dispute Settlement?, 29 INT'L LAW. 99 (1995).
During the
8.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 65-66.
transitional period, developing countries may postpone implementing most of the
required standards for a period of at least five years, and they may wait ten years
before fully protecting fields of technology that were previously excluded under
their domestic patent laws. Least-Developing Countries (LDCs) obtain a general
reprieve for ten years, while a showing of hardship may qualify them for further
See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
delays and other concessions.
Standards of Intellectual PropertyProtection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 353 (1995) [hereinafter Universal Minimum
Standards] (citing authorities and noting pipeline provision for pharmaceutical
and agrochemical patents). See also Id. at 383 (noting that LDCs may obtain

366

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:363

The officers, therefore, invited a representative sampling of
U.S. intellectual property scholars to explain and assess the

TRIPS Agreement for the benefit of the many colleagues who

gathered at the San Antonio meeting on January 4, 1996.10 Their
stimulating, often passionate, and thoroughly heterogenous
contributions comprise the bulk of this special Symposium Issue.

In the introductory remarks that follow, I will try to fit the
panelists' observations into a larger framework and to distill some
of their fidings and insights concerning the future prospects for
successful implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.

I. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT

The TRIPS Agreement is the most ambitious international
intellectual property convention ever attempted." The breadth of
subject matters comprising the "intellectual property" to which
specified minimum standards apply is unprecedented, 1 2 as is the

future waivers to alleviate hardships stemming from their obligations under the
WTO Agreement as a whole, by virtue of article XI(2) of that agreement).
9.
See, e.g.. J.H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for
Developing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated World Market, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Paper No. 73, at 41-45, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter TRIPS and Developing
Countries];see also Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the
TRIPS Agreement (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Marco
C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection In
Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1245 (1994).
10.
See supra note 3.
11.
The TRIPS Agreement mandates compliance with the main substantive
provisions of the Berne and Paris Conventions, as well as selected provisions of
the Rome Convention on Neighboring Rights and of the Washington Treaty on
Integrated Circuit Designs. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 1(3). 2, 3(0),
9(1); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised July 14, 1967. 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886. as last revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; International Convention for the Protection of Performers. Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted Oct. 26, 1961, 496
U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention]: Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits, openedfor signature May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477
[hereinafter IPIC Treaty]. The United States is not a party to the Rome
Convention.
12.
Besides imposing national treatment and most-favored-nation clauses
of its own, see TRIPS Agreement. supra note 4, arts. 3(1), 4, this Agreement
identifies seven categories of "intellectual property" that are subject to the
international minimum standards it directly establishes, in addition to standards
arising from prior international conventions. See supra note 11. These categories
include (1) copyrights and related rights; (2) trademarks; (3) geographical
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obligation of all WTO member states to guarantee that detailed
"enforcement procedures as specified in this [Agreement] are
available under their national laws."1 3 In addition, each member
state pledges its willingness to incur liability in the form of crosscollateral trade sanctions for the nullification and impairment of
benefits owed other member states under the Uruguay Round's
package deal.' 4 For the first time in history, as I have elsewhere
pointed out, these provisions "make it likely that states will lodge
actions against other states before duly constituted international
bodies, with a view to vindicating the privately owned intellectual
property rights of their citizens against unauthorized uses that
5
occur outside the domestic territorial jurisdictions."'
The first question that comes to mind is how a young and
still untested international organization like the WTO can hope to
manage the complexities of the TRIPS Agreement (and the pitfalls
it contains) when so many of its constituent members lack the
legal infrastructure, technical skills, and philosophic commitment
to make it work. To find out, we invited the two administrators
most directly concerned with this problem, viz., Adrian Otten,
Director of the WTO's Intellectual Property and Investment
Division, and his deputy, Hannu Wager, Legal Affairs Officer in
the same Division, to give us a sense of how the task of securing
"compliance with TRIPS" looked from their unique vantage point.
Their helpful and revealing article 16 builds on the earlier and
important contribution of their GATT colleagues, David Hartridge
and Arvind Subramanian, to the Vanderbilt Symposium in
1989.17

indications; (4) industrial designs; (5) patents; (6) integrated circuit designs; and
(7) trade secrets or confidential information. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4,
arts. 1(2). 3(1), 4, 9-40. An eighth subject-matter category mentioned in Part II of
the Agreement (but not included within the definition of "intellectual property") is
entitled "Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses." See Id.

art. 40. See generally Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 347-51,
379-81; 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND-A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2241-2313 (Terence
P. Stewart ed., 1993).
13.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 41-50; see also Monique L.
Cordray, GATT v. WIPO. 76 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 121, 135 (1994) (stating
that "[p]erhaps the most significant milestone in TRIPS is the enforcement
provisions").
14.
See supra note 7. For the "package deal," see Final Act, supra note 4,
art. 4 (requiring acceptance of the WTO Agreement "as a whole").
15.
Universal Minimum Standards. supranote 8. at 385.
16.
See Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The
Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391 (1996).
17.
David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights:
The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893 (1989). This foundational text
merits continued study in the light of ensuing events.

368

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:363

Messers. Otten and Wager indicate at least four directions in
which a subtle and diplomatic policy of mediation may soothe
sensibilities that prior negotiations had ruffled in order to foster a
more positive climate for future intellectual property relations
within the Council for TRIPS (Council) and other WTO forums. 18
First, they emphasize the importance of the old GATT principle of
"transparency" during the early implementation stages, especially
the "transitional phases," in which developing countries are
allowed five years to meet their basic substantive obligations and
least-developing countries (LDCs) are given at least eleven years,
and perhaps more, if they show progress in the face of
hardship. 19 This principle requires member countries to report
on the state of their legislative progress toward full compliance
with the TRIPS provisions, and these reports become a proper
focus of attention for the Council for TRIPS.
Emphasis on transparency thus spurs all states to avoid
nonconforming legislation that might become a subject of Council
deliberations. It also provides states having the biggest stake in
international intellectual property protection with a relatively
nonconfrontational mode of maintaining their momentum,
without triggering actual litigation before dispute-settlement
panels or conducting unilateral "trials" under their domestic trade
laws. However, the restraint of the United States in this regard
20
remains to be demonstrated.
Second, Otten and Wager stress the "enforcement" provisions
that member states are expected to implement in their domestic
laws, and they shed considerable light on how the WTO

18.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 71(2) (providing for two-year
reviews of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement); WTO Agreement, supra
note 4, art. IV(g) (establishing Council for TRIPS). In principle, "the periodic
reviews of the council for TRIPS should ... substitute for the unilateral policy
reviews currently undertaken by the trade representatives of leading developed
countries."
Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 384 (citing
authorities). But see Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, GATT Dispute Settlement
Agreement: Internationalizationor Eliminationof Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAW. 795,
800-01 (1992).
19.
See Otten & Wager, supra note 16, at 407-09.
20.
See supra note 18. "ITIhe Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994,
which amends section 301 ostensibly to conform to the WTO Agreement,
continues to regard a failure to provide adequate and effective protection of
Intellectual property rights as an unreasonable act, policy, or practice,
notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the
specific obligations of the [TRIPS] Agreement." Universal Minimum Standards,
supra note 8, at 384 (citing URAA, supra note 4, § 314 (c)(1), amending Trade Act
of 1974).
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Secretariat will interpret these provisions. 2 ' Once the member
states put the requisite enforcement measures in place under the
gentle spur of transparency, the unstated inference is that private
enforcement actions by rightsholders under the domestic laws
will, at least for a time, relieve the pressure for "top down"
administrative action at the international level. Private actions of
this kind will also produce a body of empirical evidence that can
better inform future consultations within the Council for TRIPS.
In this regard, particular attention will be paid to the bordercontrol measures that states must employ against counterfeit
trademarked and copyrighted goods, 2 2 an area of enforcement
that is as likely to trouble certain developed countries as it is the
23
developing countries.
Third, Otten and Wager recognize the potential importance of
technical assistance for developing and least-developing countries
seeking to reform their intellectual property systems, and they
suggest that the Council for TRIPS intends to monitor the extent
to which developed countries fulfill their obligations in this
respect. 24 Finally, they stress the collaborative arrangements
under way with sister organizations, especially the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), whose
participation in and out of the Council for TRIPS could help to
ensure a smoother implementation process.
"The aim is,

whenever possible, to resolve differences between states without

25
the need for formal recourse to dispute settlement."
Despite the level-headed and gradualist approach outlined
above, which seems consistent with general principles of
international economic law, 26 disinterested observers still worry

21.
See Otten & Wager, supra note 16, at 409-11; supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
22.
See Otten & Wager, supra note 16, at 404.
23.
See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International
Trade and the GATT, in EXPORTING OUR TECHNOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
AND TRANSFERS OF INDUSTRIAL INNNOVATIONS 3, 41-43 (Mistrale Goudreau et al. eds.,

1995) [hereinafter Intellectual Property and the GATT] (conference version
published as J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round:
Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners In an Integrated World
Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171 (1993)). See further Paul
J. Heald, Trademarks and GeographicalIndications: Exploring the Contours of the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635 (1996).
24.
See Otten & Wager, supra note 16, at 410.
25.
Id. at 411.
26.
See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property In International Trade:
Opportunitiesand Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 81227 (1989) [hereinafter GATT Connection] ("Accommodation of Intellectual Property
to International Economic Law").
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about the very different attitudes of the member states toward
intellectual property protection and about the lack of consensus
that continues to plague international intellectual property
relations notwithstanding the TRIPS Agreement. 27 During the
nineteenth century, as Stephen Ladas taught, states first
experimented with different intellectual property approaches at
the local level, and a gradual upward evolution followed thereafter
on the basis of a consensual evaluation of the interests at stake
and of the empirical results of these experiments. 28 According to
the second panelist, Professor Sam Oddi, the opposite was true of
the TRIPS Agreement, which rests on no solid theoretical or
29
empirical foundations whatsoever.
Professor Oddi's profound and searching monograph
considers whether any of the established
theories of
protection-including newer, economic theories that have gained
attention in the United States--can possibly justify the imposition
of universal standards of patent protection under the TRIPS
Agreement. To this end, he notes the irony of over-emphasizing
the natural rights thesis, as U.S. trade representatives and
industry spokespersons often did in the heat of the negotiations,
while official U.S. doctrine and practice reject it as a foundation

for our domestic intellectual property laws.3 0

Despite the

inadequacies of this thesis, which Oddi identifies, it remains very
much alive in the European Union and has recently been used to
justify proposals for new and highly anticompetitive intellectual
property rights that the U.S. authorities seem only too eager to
31
emulate.

27.
See, e.g., William B. Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter:
American Approaches to IntellectualProperty Law In East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN
LAW J. 8 (1994); Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants In InternationalCopyrightSome Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 199, 218 (1994) ("IVIarlable
mixes of universal, socially local, and legally specific values motivate copyright
transplants. .. ."); Bronckers, supra note 9. See also, GATT Connection, supra
note 26, at 751-68 ("Contrasting Theses of the Major Protagonists").
28.
See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 59-94 (1975) (tracing the gradual
evolution of norms affected by the Paris Convention); see also SAM RICKETSON, THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:

1886-

1996, at 41-125 (1987).
29.
A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of
Imperialism." 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).
30.
See Id. at 424 (citing authorities).
31.
See, e.g.. J.H. Reichman, Commodification-of Scientific Data and the
Assault on the Worldwide Public Interest in Research and Development (Jan. 28,
1996) (unpublished paper presented to the Symposium on Information, National
Policies, and International Infrastructure, Harvard Law School. Cambridge, MA)
[hereinafter Commodification of Data]; J.H. Reichman. Industrial Designs and
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Professor Oddi subjects the standards of patent protection
that the TRIPS Agreement requires to the refined tests of
32
economic analysis that he has helped to develop in recent years.
He finds it impossible to justify such a high level of protection
either under the older "social welfare" theory or under more
recent theories, such as Grady and Alexander's "rent dissipation
Nelson's 'race to invent" theory, or Kitch's
theory," Merges and
"prospect theory."3 3
Of these latter approaches, Kitch's "prospect theory" could,

perhaps, bolster the developed countries' arguments a bit more

than Oddi allows, if only because it factors economies of scale into
the overall calculus of incentives to invest that Professor Kitch
has admirably explored. 3 4 However, Kitch's recent application of
his own theories to the developing countries3 5 is less persuasive
for at least two reasons. One, which Oddi points out, is that
developing countries that lag behind the newly industrialized
countries 3 6 usually lack the infrastructure to benefit from local
usage of the patent system for the foreseeable future. These
structural impediments are aggravated by low per-capita gross
domestic product (GDP) figures, which some investigators deem a
critical obstacle to technological progress. 37 The second objection

Utility Models Under the European Communities' Proposed Initiatives: A Critical
Appraisal, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL'S THIRD ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (Hugh

Hansen ed., forthcoming 1996).
32.
See Oddi, supra note 29, at 440-54; see also A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond
Obviousness: Invention Protection In the Twenty-First Century. 38 AM. U. L. REV.
1097 (1989); A. Samuel Oddi, The International System and Third World
Development. Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831.
33.
See Oddi, supra note 29, at 440-54. See also Mark F. Grady & Jay I.
Alexander, PatentLaw and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977); Edmund W. Kitch. Patents:
Monopolies or PropertyRights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986).
See Edmund Kitch, Remarks at the Conference on the Culture and
34.
Economics of Participation in an International Intellectual Property Regime,
Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, NYU Law School (Mar. 1, 1992).
35.
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994).
36.
See, e.g., Paul C. B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual
PropertyNegotiations and Special 301 Actions. 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 90-93,
110-15 (1994) (discussing newly industrialized countries); see also Sang-Hyun
Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual
PropertyLaws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118 (1994).
37.
See, e.g., Luc Soete, Opportunitesfor and Limitations to Technological
Leapfrogging, in

TECHNOLOGY,

TRADE POLICY AND

THE URUGUAY ROUND,

U.N.

Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/ITP/23, at 3-29 (1990)
[hereinafter TECHNOLOGY, TRADE POLICY AND THE URUGUAY ROUND].
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is that Kitch is too obsessed with patents as the sole instrument

for triggering the efficiencies of his prospect theory.
Under the modern conditions that define the so-called
"information age," the patent paradigm tends to become obsolete
and counterproductive the more it is used to protect relatively
small and incremental applications of know-how to industry that
are characteristic of important new technologies.3 8 What the
developing countries need for the immediate future is not strong,
nineteenth-century-type patent protection, but rather, more
appropriate intellectual property regimes to stimulate investment
in new technologies and in various forms of subpatentable
innovation that lie within their limited technical reach. Whether
the developing countries opted for a "utility model" regime or a
"patents of importation" regime, as Oddi and I have, at different
times, suggested, 3 9 or for a general purpose innovation law built
on modified liability principles that I deem more promising, 40 they
could arguably accelerate their catch-up time notwithstanding
their obligations to recognize foreign patents under the TRIPS

Agreement.

41

When criticizing other theories that fail to justify strong
patent protection in developing countries, Professor Oddi also
takes me to task for what he construes as a "portable fence"
theory of international patent protection. 42 In this regard, he
refers to my observation in 1989 that states can no longer afford
to disrespect aliens' intangible property rights for many of the

38.
See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2434-52, 2504-57 (1994) Ihereinafter
Legal Hybrids]; Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H.
Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2308. 2332-65 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto];
see also J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy:
Premisesfor a Restructured InternationalIntellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 504-20 (1995).
See, e.g.. Oddi. supra note 29; TRIPS and Developing Countries, supra
39.
note 9, at 39-40.
40.
See, e.g., Legal Hybrids, supra note 38, at 2519-56; see also J.H.
Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software Fared
Badly, and What Are the Solutions. 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763, 786-94
(1995) [hereinafter Know-How Gap in TRIPS].
41.
See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property Rights and the
Dissemination of Technical Knowledge: A Pro-Competitive Strategy for Compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement (Nov. 22, 1995) (paper presented to the Experts Meeting
on New Issues in the Area of Intellectual Property Rights and the Transfer of
Technology, Competitiveness, and International Trade, Division for Science and
Technology, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Geneva, Switzerland) (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Reichman, Pro-Competitive
Strategy].
42.
See Oddi, supra note 29, at 452-54.
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same reasons that ultimately impelled public international law to
require states to prevent the uncompensated confiscation of
aliens' tangible property within their territorial jurisdictions. I
demur, however, on the grounds that I made no assertion either
that strong patent protection followed from an international
obligation to respect property rights in intellectual creations or
that there was only one standard of compensation even for publicpurpose takings of tangible property.
On the contrary, in advocating "an even-handed approach" to
international intellectual property relations, I argued that it would
violate fundamental precepts of international economic law if the
developed countries failed to differentiate between developing and
least-developing countries (LDCs) when formulating minimum
standards under the TRIPS Agreement. 4 3 Although a spokesman
for the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) scoffed at this claim, 44
the Final Act did, indeed, establish a two-tiered approach that
distinguished between the obligations of developing countries,
which mature five years after the TRIPS Agreement takes effect,
and those of LDCs, which are postponed for a decade or more
depending on the problems these countries encounter along the
45
way.
Despite Professor Oddi's long-standing belief that patents are
bad for developing countries, his assessment of the future is more
optimistic than one might expect. He admits that the developing
countries' present difficulties may not adequately foretell the
future benefits they could derive from the domestic patent
systems as their technical prowess improves. He also believes
that these countries can limit even the immediate social costs of
these systems by a suitable mix of doctrinal ploys drawn from
existing state practices. In this respect, he and I have reached
46
some common findings and recommendations.
Professor Fred Abbott's commentary on the articles by Oddi,
and Otten and Wager echoes this real politik theme of moderate
optimism. 4 7
Abbott also participated in the Vanderbilt
Symposium of 1989, in which context he defended the theme of
"protecting First World assets in the Third World." 48 Since then,

43.
See GATT Connection, supra note 26, at 796-827, 864-75, 887-91.
44.
See Emory Simon, Remarks, 22 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 370 (1989).
45.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46.
Compare Oddi. supra note 29, at 455-69, with Relchman, ProCompetitive Strategy, supra note 4 1.
47.
Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary:
The International Intellectual
Property OrderEnters the 21st Century, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471 (1996).
48.
See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT MultilateralFramework, 22
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he has written widely on international trade and its new interface
with intellectual property law, and the4 9Section awaits his latest
publications with considerable interest.
For present purposes, Professor Abbott concedes that the
TRIPS standards may be higher than is good for the developing
countries as a class, but he emphasizes the quid pro quo of trade
concessions, which gave these countries greater access to
developed country markets, especially in the agricultural and
textile sectors. 50 While opinions differ about the overall value of
these concessions, I would add that the growing ability of the
developing countries to penetrate developed markets for
manufactured goods of all kinds should not be underestimated.
Even if the developing countries gave up considerably more than
they received with respect to intellectual property, they may
obtain considerably more than they bargained for from the
lowering of tariffs and nontariff barriers generally under GATT
1994.51

If, as Professor Abbott augurs, the developing countries also
produce more technology over time, owing in part to the
incentives that the TRIPS Agreement will make available, then

their part of the bargain may turn out very vell in the end.
Meanwhile, both Abbott and Oddi stress the continued
importance of the doctrine of international exhaustion, which the
TRIPS Agreement leaves intact, as a helpful safeguard in limiting
52
some of the ill effects of too much protection too soon.
II. THE INTERFACE WITH COMPETITION LAW

While opinions differ as to whether higher standards of
intellectual property protection will stimulate more direct
vAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989). For other views sounding a similar theme, see
R. Michael Gadbaw. Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or
Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (1989); Marshall A.
Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilaterallsm, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991).
49.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO/TRIPS Agreement and Global
Economic Development. In PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
(Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., forthcoming 1996); Abbott, supra
note 7.
50.
See Abbott. supra note 47, at 472-73.
51.
See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11(4) and Annex IA (GATT
1994); see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), annexed to
the Final Act, supra note 4. reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 4. at 485-558.
52.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6: Abbott, supra note 47, at
478-79.
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investment in developing countries and more transfers of
technology from developed countries, 53 any country's overreliance on imported technology must sooner or later become a
dead end. The real challenge for developing countries is to
increase their own capacity to learn from each new infusion of
imported technology and from the relevant technical knowledge
54
that expert circles in developed countries take for granted.
These efforts to lessen dependence on foreign suppliers of
technological goods, however, conflict with the countervailing
policies of developed countries to restrict the flow of technical
knowledge and to enhance the appropriability of technical
yields. 55
One such tendency that has received insufficient
attention is for governments in the developed countries to relax
their antitrust laws in favor of horizontal collaborative practices,
including joint research among natural competitors and pooled
licensing agreements. These and other practices, coupled with
strong market power and high levels of transnational intellectual
property protection, make it harder for firms in developing
countries to gain access to the most valuable new technologies. 56
The developing countries will logically have to formulate
appropriate legal responses to these problems. The question this
poses is whether--or at what point-such responses risk
undermining the interests of intellectual property rightsholders,
as guaranteed by the TRIPS Agreement. A second question is
whether new international minimum standards of competition law
are needed to regulate this area and to maintain a proper

53.
Compare Oddi, supranote 29 (pessimistic view) with Richard T. Rapp &
Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in
Developing Countries. 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75 (1990) (optimistic view) and Keith
Maskus & D. Eby Konan. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: Issues and
Exploratory Results, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM 401 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 1994) (neutral view).
54.
See, e.g., Soete, supra note 37, at 11-24; P. Cohendet et al..
Technological Learning, Economic Networks and Innovation Appropriability, in
TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 66-77 (Dominique

Foray & Christopher

Freeman eds., 1993).

55.

See, e.g., Paolo Bifani. The New Mercantilism and the International

Appropriation of Technology, in TECHNOLOGY, TRADE POLICY AND THE URUGUAY
ROUND, supra note 37, at 145. 160-64.

See, e.g., Harns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection,InadequateTrade,
56.
Adequate Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY.?,
153-210 (John 0. Haley & Hiroshi lyori eds., 1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST AS
TRADE REMEDY]; Carlos M. Correa, Trends in Technology Transfers: Implicationsfor
Developing Countries, 21 SCI. & POL'Y 369-80 (1994) (U.K.); Bifani, supra note 55,
at 160-64, 175-77.
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balance.5 7 The debate has become heated because some scholars
who see antitrust law as a "new international trade remedy" want
it to curb the protectionist thrust of higher intellectual property
standards, whereas another group of equally distinguished
scholars has proposed a countervailing Draft Antitrust Code for
the "World Trade
and Legal System,"5 8 which would circumscribe
59
such policies.
Against this background, Professor Eleanor Fox has
contributed a brilliant article to the Symposium, which
illuminates this field as a whole and seeks to avoid the pitfalls
inherent in the relatively ambitious proposals already on the
table. 60
Professor Fox emphasizes that while the TRIPS
Agreement permits states to regulate abuses of intellectual
property rights, subject to certain duties of cooperation and
consultation, it does not endorse any particular view of, or
approach to, this thorny topic. "TRIPS calls for a concept of the
limits of antitrust; it does not call for formulation of the core and
61
normal scope for antitrust."
In principle, the right of a state to adopt and enforce antitrust

laws should not violate or undermine that state's obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement; but in practice, there Is no
consensus about where such lines are to be drawn or even about
the best policy moves to promote competition. To demonstrate
just how strong the disagreement really is, Professor Fox analyzes
three of the hardest issues concerning alleged misuse of

57.
See, e.g.. Ullrich, supra note 56, at 193-210; Eleanor M. Fox,
CompetitionLaw and the Agendafor the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and
Trade. in ANTITRUST AS TRADE REMEDY, supra note 56, at 1-36.
58.
See Working Group, International Antitrust Code, Draft International
Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurlateral Trade Agreement. July 10, 1993,
reprinted in WORLD TRADE MATERIALS, Sept. 1993, at 126 [hereinafter Draft
InternationalAntitrust Code]; see also J.H. Reichman, Beyond the HistoricalLines of
Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade
After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 109-13 (1993)
[hereinafter Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights and Trade] (discussing
these proposals).
59.
See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for
the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal Systems, J. WORLD TRADE, July 1993, at 35,
35-41; John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 24 (1992); Wolfgang Flkentscher, On the Proposed
Antitrust Code, in ANTITRUST AS TRADE REMEDY, supra note 56, at 345-59. See also
The PrincevilleDialogue, in ANTITRUST AS TRADE REMEDY, supra note 56, at 359-408;
Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Draft International Antitrust Code: Objections and
Rejoinders, 26 INT'L REV. IND. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [IIC] 999 (1995).
60.
See Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition and Intellectual Property-TRIPS
and Its Antitrust Counterparts,29 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481 (1996).
61.
Id.
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patents-monopoly pricing, refusals to deal, and contracts to limit
parallel imports-and concludes that European and U.S. courts
would reach opposite conclusions under their respective
62
competition laws.
Although the TRIPS Agreement contains a rudimentary
"positive list" of measures that states may implement to curb
abuse of intellectual property rights, Professor Fox believes that
"[w]riting interface rules in advance would be a daunting and
probably unwise enterprise," given the lack of consensus. 63 She
recommends, instead, a case-by-case or "common law"
evolutionary approach, buttressed by a core group of guiding
principles. Paramount among these are the notions that "existing
developed systems of antitrust are presumptively legitimate, even
though they may function as a limitation on intellectual property
rights,' 6 4 and that states are free to pick and choose from among

the doctrines in use under these systems when formulating their
own approaches. At the same time, adversely affected states
should remain free to appeal to the TRIPS mediatory and disputesettlement mechanisms in an effort to rebut the presumption of
validity. 6 5
Professor Fox points out that the interest of developing
countries in more competition, fairness in licensing, and market
access-at the expense of strengthened intellectual property
rights-was a position that the United States once shared. 6 6 In
this connection, I have elsewhere proposed that developing
countries can and should formulate their own "jurisprudence of
licensing" under their domestic laws, and that they should
legislatively impose a contractual rider on transfers of technology
that automatically invokes principles of fairness, the preservation
of competition, and due regard for the role of the scientific and
67
educational communities in national economic development.

62.
Id. at 494. For the differing approaches, see also Spencer Weber
Waller & Noel J. Byrne, Changing Views of Intellectual Property and Competition
Law in the European Community and the United States of America, 20 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1993); Leo J. Raskind, Licensing Under the United States Antitrust Law,
20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 49 (1993).

63.
Fox, supra note 60, at 491.
64.
Id. at 491-92.
65.
Id. at 493.
66.
Id. at 490.
67.
See Pro-Competitive Strategy, supra note 41; see also J.H. Reichman,
From Free Riders to Fair Followers:
Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement (Mar. 1. 1996) (unpublished paper presented to the Conference on the
Culture and Economics of Participation in an International Intellectual Property
Regime, Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, NYU Law School)
[hereinafter From Free Riders to Fair Followers).
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Because "there is no set of rules and principles . . . that
would be acceptable to all," Professor Fox rejects the rule-making
format of the Draft International Antitrust Code, even though she

participated (with a quasi-dissenting voice) in its formulation. 68
In contrast, she proposes to limit the search for universal
standards to two basic norms: (1) to preserve market access and
prevent anticompetitive exclusions, and (2) to prevent
anticompetitive collaborations of competitors designed to raise
prices (for example, "pooling and crosslicensing as a cover for a
cartel").6 9 In her view, these twin principles of market access and
anticartellization should become the cornerstones of a minimalist
international convention on competition law. Such a convention
would allow participating states great leeway in formulating
domestic statutes; it would keep the evolution of the misuse
doctrine firmly within the bounds of general antitrust theory, with
its focus on market power; and it would provide a forum within
the WTO where patterns of systematic nonenforcement of
70
intellectual property rights could be challenged.

III. IMPACT OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC DISCIPLINES

In the second part of the Symposium, we asked the
participants to address the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the
three main fields of intellectual property law, viz., patents,
copyrights, and trademarks. 7 1 Their responses elaborate on
themes heard earlier. They also raise hard questions for which
the empirical data, when available at all, provide ambiguous
answers; and, not surprisingly, their diverse theoretical
viewpoints continue the passionate debate opened in part one.
A. PatentableInventions
Professor Martin Adelman and his co-author, Sonia Baldia,
take issue with Professor Oddi by arguing that economic analysis
does justify strong international minimum standards of patent

68.
See Draft InternationalAntitrust Code, supra note 58: Fox, supra note
60, at 498; supra note 59 and accompanying text.
69.
Fox, supranote 60, at 502.
70.
Id. at 503-05.
71.
For discussion of trade secrets, unfair competition, integrated circuits,
and industrial designs. see, e.g., Universal Minimum Standards,supra note 8, at
374-79, 381-82 (citing authorities).
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protection. 72 In their view, a universal patent system will, on the
whole, benefit the world community by eliminating the free-riders'
disincentives to innovate in all market structures and by
increasing the supply of needed inventions that would otherwise
not have been made. Even if "those who pay monopoly prices for
products that for one reason or another would have been invented
in the absence of a patent system... [are] apparent losers[,]...
they also benefit from products that are off-patent, but which may
not have been developed in the absence of a patent system.
Therefore, there may not be many losers, indeed, there may not
73
be any."
In the specific context of the pharmaceutical industry, for
example, the dilemma for free-riders is that they leave "the cost of
the development of new drugs" to the developed world "and hope
that the failure to participate will not stunt so many drugs'
development that the strategy backfires." 74
Moreover,
technological development to meet the free-riding country's
special needs, such as cures for locally endemic diseases, may not
be forthcoming if these needs are not shared by countries with

patent systems that encourage investment in research and
development.
To support their thesis that the reduction of free-riding under
the TRIPS provisions concerning patents will benefit everyone,
Adelman and Baldia present India as an empirical case in point.
Before the TRIPS Agreement, the Indian government had
deliberately taken the pharmaceutical industry out of its patent
system and built a tariff wall to protect it. The result was that
"Indian manufacturers of bulk drugs and formulations not only
dominate the Indian market but are among the most fiercely
competitive in the world," especially with regard to the production
of generic drugs.7 5 At the same time, Indian investment in
pharmaceutical research and development was extremely low, and
local firms contributed nothing to the development of new drugs.
This will change under the TRIPS Agreement, however, as
indicated by rising investment in research and development and

72.
Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent
Provision in the TRIPS Agreement. The Case of India, 29 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507
(1996).
73.
Id. at 510. For analogous views concerning potential long-term gains
to developing countries from the reduction of free-riding in technology driven
economies, see, e.g., Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property
Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 2664 (1989).
74.
Adelman & Baldia. supra note 72, at 510.

75.

Id. at 525.
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by the stipulation of joint research ventures with major foreign
companies. With stronger patent norms in place, Adelman and
Baldia expect India to develop "a vigorous and thriving [researchand-development] based drug sector," with particular focus on
diseases of local importance, and they predict that Indian
pharmaceutical companies will rival those in the developed
76
countries within a few decades.
The optimism of Adelman and Baldia contrasts not only with
the views of Professor Oddi and the pessimists he cites 7 7 but also
with the pessimistic conclusions of F.M. Scherer, based on his
recent study of the pharmaceutical industry in Italy. 78 That
industry, well positioned as it was, has so far failed to capitalize
on the introduction of strong patent protection for pharmaceutical
products in 1978. 79 Professor Scherer has publicly expressed the
doubt that, if the Italians cannot make it work, the prospects for
developing countries appear even dimmer. 80
In this context, I wonder if the empirical evidence marshalled
by Adelman and Baldia does not tell a slightly different story from
the one they propose. According to today's prevailing view, the
bad old policies of import substitution could only hurt the
developing countries, and the castor oil of free trade is what they
really needed to jump start their economies. 8 1 And yet, by a
combination of weak patents, strong tariff protection, and other
measures favoring infant industries, the price of drugs in India
remains among the lowest in the world, while "Indian
manufacturers of generic drugs and formulations not only

76.
Id. at 530. See also Carlos A. Primo-Braga & Carsten Fink, The
Economic Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns of
Convergence and Conflict (Oct. 1995) (unpublished paper presented to the
Symposium on Public Policy and Global Technological Integration, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, Chicago, IL) (emphasizing future positive effects of intellectual
property rights on investment in research and development for developing
countries).
77.
See Oddi. supra note 29.
78.
See F.M. Scherer & Sandy Weisburst, Economic Effects of Strengthening
PharmaceuticalPatent Protectionin Italy, 26 IIC 1009, 1023-24 (1995) (concluding
that "the legitimization of drug product patents in Italy did not induce a market
shift in Italian pharmaceutical manufacturers' strategic emphasis from emulating
drugs developed elsewhere to developing innovative drugs"; research and
did not accelerate after the patent regime
development "expenditure growth ...
transition" and "the number and character of new product launches did not
change significantly").
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 1024 (stating that "one must remain skeptical whether
significantly increased drug development efforts are likely in the nations required
under the... [TRIPS Agreement] to offer drug product patents for the first time").
81.

See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL

SYSTEM 210-20 (1987) ("The Case Against Preferential Treatment").
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dominate the Indian market but are among the most fiercely
competitive in the world."8 2 All this was the direct result of
policies that allowed these companies to "access the latest drugs
all over the world, re-engineer them through new processes, and

sell them in the domestic market.

'83

In other words, Oddi might

find this a rare but demonstrably successful case of import
substitution.
Perhaps the truth lies in the different time frames of analysis
and in the ensuing growth of per capita GDP, which Professor
Soete believes must reach a certain point before sustained
technological development becomes feasible. 8 4 In other words, a
weak patent system may have stimulated the growth of India's
pharmaceutical base at phase one, when per capita GDP was low,
while a strong patent system may favor the future growth and
maturity of that same industry. But this hypothesis would make
Professor Oddi's concerns about other developing countries still in
their initial phase more relevant, and it would reinforce the need
for measures to limit the adverse effects of higher levels of patent
protection in most developing countries, which both he and I have
8 5
independently recommended.
In contrast, Professor Harold Wegner shows how the patent
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement can boomerang even against
leading developed countries, some of whose comfortable
protectionist habits will have to give way before the subtle
combination of national treatment and 'TRIPS treatment" that
has become universal law.86 Wegner retraces the rocky road to
patent harmonization among the developed countries and shows
the extent to which U.S. interests have recently derailed it. 8 7 In
his view, United States implementation of the TRIPS provisions
has so far been halfhearted and inadequate because the patent
authorities are reluctant to abandon long-standing discriminatory

advantages built into the domestic law. He identifies at least two
sections of the patent law and one regulation that still fail to meet
the TRIPS standards, although these may be used as bargaining
chips in a future harmonization exercise that Wegner hopes will

82.
Adelman & Baldia, supranote 72, at 525.
83.
Id. at 527.
84.
See Soete, supra note 37, at 11-24. See also Bifani. supra note 55, at
159 (stating that newly industrialized countries, especially Korea. Taiwan, China,
Brazil, and Mexico "have . . . increased substantially the research and
development component of their exports and imports").
85.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
86.
Harold C. Wegner, TRIPS Boomerang-Oblgationsfor Domestic Reform,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 535 (1996).
87.
Id.; see generally HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION 37-42
(1993).
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produce the ingenious "patent worksharing" arrangement he
advocates. 88
One wonders, meanwhile, whether the example set by the
United States halfhearted legislative response will not prove

contagious and thus weaken the resolve of other countries to
fulfill both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement. At the same
time, it raises the prospects that other countries may sue the
United States for noncompliance, and their success would disturb
the complacency that currently reigns in official circles. Let us
return to this theme in the context of copyright law.
B. CopyrightableLiterary and Artistic Works
Four panelists commented on the copyright provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement, and they may be split into two camps that
more or less parallel the divisions expressed earlier. On the one
side, Eric Smith, President of the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA), and Professor Hugh Hansen both
championed the high-protectionist cause.
On the other side,
Professors Peter Jaszi and Marci Hamilton questioned the social
costs to users of the copyrighted culture under universal
minimum standards of protection.
Smith's article identifies the empirical necessity of stemming
the losses to publishers in developed countries from free-riding
uses of copyrighted works in developing countries as a driving
force behind the TRIPS negotiations, and he marshals an array of
statistical evidence to back the publishers' demand for relief.8 9
These losses represent lost jobs and growth for the U.S. economy,
which already suffers other, more legitimate losses due to the
comparative advantages of the developing countries in a growing
number of manufacturing sectors.
Accordingly, Smith stresses the publishers' need for strict

compliance with the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, 90 a sentiment echoed in Otten and Wager's outline of
the initial approaches to compliance within the WTO framework. 91
The publishers will also claim that, because the national
treatment requirement of TRIPS is not subject to transitional

88.
See Wegner, supra note 86, at 542. See also Lauren A. Degnan, Does
U.S. Patent Law Comply with TRIPS Articles 3 and 27 with Respect to the Treatment
of Inventive Activity?. 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 108, 119-20 (1996)
(finding substantial, but not literal, compliance).
89.
Eric H. Smith, Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559 (1996).
90.
See id.
91.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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delay on a par with other substantive provisions, developing
countries must immediately end discrimination against foreigners
in the application and enforcement of their domestic copyright
92
laws.
Looking to the future, Smith foresees that the WTO's disputesettlement machinery may be engaged to resolve tensions over
retroactive protection, bootlegged recordings, the scope of
protection for computer programs, the scope of public
performance and communication rights, and the continued
legitimacy of private copying exceptions. 93 Although he evidently
foresees that publishers would win such disputes, I do not
altogether share his optimism.
With regard to computer programs, in particular, if the
publishers truly wish to define the scope of protection in the
course of a WTO dispute proceeding, I have elsewhere advised the
developing countries to join the issue and vindicate their rights to
reimplement functional behavior in independently generated
code. 94 The same precedents that have limited the scope of
software protection in the U.S. federal appellate courts would
almost certainly cause publishers to lose again at the
international level. 95 What remains to be seen is how the United
States will react when "beefed-up WTO panels make decisions
that . . . become binding internationally," even though these

decisions are inconsistent with the views of the Chamber of
Commerce or of our legislative and administrative authorities. 9 6
Are citizens of the United States really willing to have such
important questions affecting domestic intellectual property law
decided by WTO panels?
Professor Hugh Hansen provides a theoretical foundation for
Eric Smith's empirical arguments by extolling the very natural
rights philosophy 9 7 that Professor Oddi so vigorously castigated. 98
Hansen mocks both the "secular priesthood" of the pre-

92.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4. arts. 3, 65-66; Smith, supra note
89, at 573-74.
93.
Smith, supra note 89, at 576-77.
94.
See Reichman. Pro-CompetitiveStrategy. supra note 41.
See Know-How Gap In TRIPS, supra note 40, at 779-84; Samuelson et
95.
al., supra note 38, at 2330-43, 2347-61; see also Pamela Samuelson, Computer
Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A
Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1992).
Universal Minimum Standards, supra note 8, at 388. For the view that
96.
gap-filling precedents by such international tribunals are desirable, see Geller,
supra note 7, at 107-14.
Hugh Hansen, International Copyright- An Unorthodox Analysis, 29
97.
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1996).

98.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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technological academy and the "agnostics and atheists" who have
sacrificed the cause of authors' rights to the generic category of
"users," including "Internet (net) users, developing nations,
consumers, small competitors, and creators of derivative
works."9 9

While acknowledging that the "copyright crusade in

large part
overzealous
inevitably
voluntarily
protection)

has been driven by trade considerations" and
"missionaries," he believes the uninitiated will
convert to the high-protectionist cause, either
(because they see some self-interest in copyright
or involuntarily (because they fear unilateral trade

pressures). 100

Professor Hansen acknowledges that U.S. ownership of most
exported intellectual property "seems to upset people throughout
the world." But they will simply have to get used to the remaking
of international copyright law in our image, including such
indispensable expedients as the protection of computer programs
for 50 to 100 years or more, preferably under Whelan, but at least
under Altai.' 0 1
I have elsewhere expressed the view that copyright law
cannot effectively protect computer programs or other forms 0of2
industrial property without serious anticompetitive results.
The "high protectionist" program that many advocate today could
contribute to the technological decline of the United States and
the European Union vis-a-vis more competitive developing
countries in the not too distant future.' 0 3 There is also a risk
that today's high-protectionists will themselves become upset
when more and more foreign intellectual property owners
routinely begin to demand tribute from users and second comers

under the national treatment clause of the
in the United States
04
TRIPS Agreement.1
Certainly, the cause of users and second comers is
uppermost in the minds of Professors Jaszi and Hamilton. For

99.
Hansen, supra note 97, at 584.
100. Id. at 584-93.
101. See Id. at 591; Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (broad protection for elements of structure, sequence, and
organization), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cr. 1992) (narrow scope of protection for functional
components of computer programs under "successive filtering test").
102. See Samuelson et al., Man festo, supra note 38, at 2356-64 (case of
computer programs); Legal Hybrids. supra note 38, at 2488-90 (case of Industrial
designs). See also Jerome H. Relchman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer
Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 24 IIC 446, 455-75 (1993) [hereinafter
Electronic Information Tools].
103. See From Free Riders to Fair Followers, supra note 67.
104. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3.
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example, Professor Jaszi contends that new U.S. legislation
implementing the TRIPS Agreement, especially the provisions that
protect live musical performances and that restore foreign
radical
copyrights from the public domain,10 5 represents a
transformation of the purposes of copyright law that undermines
its constitutional foundations in the United States. 0 6 In the
past, U.S. legal theory typically justified copyright protection only
to the extent that it stimulated progress in the arts and sciences
by enriching the store of literary and artistic works that would
enter the public domain and thereby become freely available to
users of the copyrighted culture. 0 7 But this "cultural bargain"
theory has now given way to the new, trade-driven goal of
copyright law, which seeks to "enhance ... the wealth and overall
financial well-being of companies which invest in the production
and distribution of copyrighted works."' 0 8
Professor Jaszi develops new constitutional arguments to
limit this approach.' 0 9 In so doing, he queries the wisdom of the
United States rapid conversion from its historically tepid support

for copyright protection to the maximalist vision enshrined in the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA);1 1° and he fears that our
historical emphasis on the public interest has been eclipsed in the
process. For Jaszi, indeed, the scholar's most pressing task is to
devise new vocabularies for defending user interests and to
articulate why the public domain matters, and he foresees some
expansion of competition law to redress the balance."'
Like Professor Jaszi, Professor Marci Hamilton believes that
the traditional balance between private and public interests in the
domestic copyright laws has been skewed too far toward single2
Like
minded protectionist goals under the TRIPS Agreement."

See URAA, supra note 4. §§ 512, 514 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1101,
105.
104A (1994)).
Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature)
106.
Adieu to a Constitutionally-GroundedDiscourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law.
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996).
107. See id.; see also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE
OF COPYRIGHT-A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 146-62, 191-242 (1991); PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY:

THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE

CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15-36 (1994).
108. Jaszi, supra note 106, at 599.
Compare, e.g., id. at 601-11 with David Nimmer. The End of Copyright,
109.
48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1408-12 (1995).
110. See Jaszi, supra note 106, at 599-601; supra notes 4 & 105.
See Jaszi, supra note 106. See also Jessica Litman, The PublicDomain,
111.
39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain. 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981).
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement. Imperialistic,Outdated, and
112.
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996).
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Oddi, Hamilton sees the universalization of these minimum
standards as a form of cultural imperialism. However, she does
not think it all bad that undemocratic states are forced to come to
terms with the human rights dimension that historically underlies
1 13
the cultural policy of mature copyright systems.
Professor Hamilton's main concern is that the TRIPS
Agreement, which arrives at a turning point in the history of
communications, ignores new information technologies and
thereby stacks the deck too much in favor of private rather than
public interests. Although she continues to believe that authors'
rights are more important than ever to sustain the quality of
cultural contributions to an on-line universe of discourse, she
advocates the need to reformulate the public interest in a "freeuse zone" and to implement that zone within the global
information infrastructure. This would recreate cyberspace
parallels to the fair use and personal use exceptions in the print
dimension. Otherwise, "the limited monopoly currently afforded
copyright owners has the potential to become an 'absolute
monopoly over the distribution of and access to copyrighted
information,'" once such information is routinely transmitted on14
line.'

Like Professor Hamilton, I, too, believe that the principle
weakness of the TRIPS Agreement is its backward-looking
character, which "stems from the drafters' technical inability and
political reluctance to address the problems facing innovators and
investors at work on important new technologies in an Age of
Information.""1 5 I also share her concerns about the newfound
ability of on-line publishers to charge what the market will bear
for each and every use (owing to the enhanced contractual power
that on-line distribution confers)," 6 a power that will be
magnified by the European Communities new Directive on
databases."17 Against this background, Professor Hamilton's call

113. See Id. See also Marci A. Hamilton. Art Speech. 49 VAND. L. REV. 73,
96-101 (1996).
114.
Hamilton, supra note 112, at 628-29 (quoting ASS'N OF RESEARCH
LIBRARIES,
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PROPERTY:
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OF RESEARCH

LIBRARIES

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1 (May 1994)).

115. Know-How Gap In TRIPS. supra note 40, at 766.
116. See Reichman, Electronic Information Tools. supra note 102, at 465-68
("Public Interest at Odds with the Two-Party Deal"); see also GOLDSTEIN. supra
note 107, at 224, 230 (stressing importance of exemptions for research and
educational uses in on-line universe).
117. See, e.g., Debra B. Roster. The European Union's Proposed Directivefor
the Legal Protection of Databases: A New Threat to the Free Flow of information, 10
HIGH TECH L.J. 105, 136-46 (1995); Pamela Samuelson. Missing Foundation of the
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for a renewal of the copyright balance, and for new instruments of
transnational collection to implement it, merits careful attention.
C. Trademarks and GeographicalIndications of Origin
It is not widely known that, for all its weaknesses with
respect to patents, the Paris Convention already contained a
relatively well-developed set of international minimum standards
pertaining to trademarks.'1 8 Perhaps this is why Professor Paul
Heald wryly observes that writers on the TRIPS Agreement act as
though its upgraded trademark provisions lack "sex appeal" when
compared to the patent and copyright provisions." 9 This relative
lack of controversy shifts the main focus of attention to
enforcement measures, especially the mandatory border controls.
As to the developing countries, Heald emphasizes that trademark
protection "prevents marketplace confusion that is detrimental to
the interests of consumers in every nation" and "increases
1 20
consumer wealth by improving consumer information.'
More controversial are the provisions concerning geographical
indications in general and the special provisions for wines and
spirits.' 2 1 These measures reflect some of the tradeoffs that U.S.
interests had to make in order to secure European support in
other areas, and they open a path that, sooner or later, may lead
either to the dispute-resolution table or to the negotiating table, if

not both.
Professor Heald criticizes the tepid adjustment that U.S. law
has so far made to the technical requirements of the relevant
TRIPS standards, which could set a bad example for other
countries. 122 He also criticizes the failure of the negotiators to
deal with the problem of exhaustion, and he presents a wellreasoned defense of the right to import genuine "gray-market"
goods. (In this regard, the wide differences of opinion among all
the panelists on the general question of exhaustion should not
pass unremarked.) Professor Heald also faults the drafters for
omitting to require the actual use of registered marks.
On the whole, however, he finds the TRIPS provisions on
marks and geographical appellations "a significant improvement
over prior ineffectual regimes."
The net result should be a

Proposed European Database Directive (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author); Reichman, Commodification of Data, supra note 31.
118. Paris Convention, supra note 11, arts. 6-1Oter.
119. Heald, supra note 23, at 637.
120. Id. at 655.
121.
See Id. at 651-52 (citing authorities).
122. Id. at 650-55.
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transnational system that looks more and more like that with
which U.S. businesses are already familiar.' 2 3

IV.

THE FUTURE OF THE

TRIPS

AGREEMENT

When all the panelists had finished their spirited
presentations to our annual meeting, I began to wonder what
impressions the first presenters-Adrian Otten and Hannu
Wager' 2 4-would draw from this event in the privacy of their WTO
offices. Until now, I suspect, they had heard mostly the chorus of
voices emanating from the USTR, the USPTO, and the various
U.S. lobbying groups, all cheering together for ever higher levels
of intellectual property protection. Here, instead, was a group of
eminent U.S. scholars worried about competition, the public
interest, users' rights, and other concerns normally attributed to
developing countries (who, it is sometimes said, do not really
know their own interests).
I asked myself what this debate, and the serious theoretical
conflicts it revealed among U.S. intellectual property scholars,
portends for future efforts to achieve universal compliance with

the TRIPS Agreement. Is it all just sound and fury, some sterile
theological controversy out of touch with political and economic
realities, as some suggest? I think not. On the contrary, the
tensions generated by the TRIPS Agreement portend a major
realignment of interests that will cross national boundaries and
will ultimately shift the balance between incentives to create and
free competition to the global marketplace and away from the
25
territorial legal and economic jurisdictions.1
In the past, the United States and the European Community
preached the virtues of competitive markets to developing
countries that were mired in command economies. The collapse
of these command economies means that the developing countries
will now take the developed countries at their word and demand
to compete in the world market. The real question is not whether
these countries can compete, even in markets for technological
and information goods, but whether the developed countries still
have the stomach for stiff global competition once it becomes a
legal and economic reality. Contrary to what they preach, the

123. Id. at 660.
124. See Otten & Wager, supra note 16.
125. Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 7 (The object of the Agreement
is to "contribute to the promotion of technological innovation ... [,j to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge . .. 1,1and to a
balance of rights and obligations.").
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developed countries have embarked on such a sustained
protectionist path with respect to technological goods that it may
in the emerging-and very
well compromise their future standing
126
competitive-global market place.
For the foreseeable future, in other words, "the logical task of
the developing countries is to shoulder the pro-competitive mantle
abandoned elsewhere when implementing obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement in their domestic laws."'1 27 To the extent that
these countries systematically adhere to lower levels of protection
than their more developed counterparts, their firms may become
ever more competitive with respect to those in the developed
countries.
If the developing countries do become bastions of free
competition, they will increasingly represent the interests of
consumers, users, second comers (and, more generally, of smalland medium-sized entrepreneurs) in developed countries as well.
Over time, in other words, a small pharmaceutical company in
India may have more in common with its small U.S. counterparts
than with the big Indian pharmaceutical companies discussed in
Adelman and Baldia's article. 128 This transnational commonality
of interests should, in turn, stabilize the TRIPS dispute resolution
process. It will make it harder for a coterie of oligopolists to
capture their respective trade representatives, 1 2 9 and fewer
countries will be able to speak with a single voice as a result.
Until this new equilibrium of public-private interests emerges
on a global scale, however, there will be tensions and sometimes
even turmoil within the organizations charged with securing
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and with the other
components of the Uruguay Round. If the institutions hold and
the WTO survives a period of uncertainty, this new balancing of
interests at the international level should gradually reveal who
the real winners and losers under TRIPS will be or if, indeed,
there have to be any losers at all, as Adelman and Baldia
30
augur.1
I predict that those countries that maintain a competitive
posture, that aggressively seek to master technical knowledge,
and that continue to rationalize their national innovation systems
will do well over time. By the same token, those countries that

See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text; From Free Riders to
126.
Fair Followers, supra note 67.
127. Pro-CompetitiveStrategy. supra note 41.
128. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 72.
129. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 59 (noting tendency of trade
representatives to respond primarily to narrow lobbying groups).
130. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 72, at 510.
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seek to preserve short-term, highly vulnerable technological
advantages behind anticompetitive, high-protectionist barriers of
one kind or another risk losing out in the end.
With this meditation, I commend the panelists to the wider
audience that publication of this Symposium makes possible.
And I thank them warmly for their spirited contributions and
provocative insights, which should illuminate the process of
securing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement for years to come.

